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1. INTRODUCTION 
In New Zealand the children and young persons legislation 
relating to child care, protection and measures for dealing 
with young offenders used to be mainly contained in the Child 
Welfare Act 1925. This Act, with amendments, remained in force 
for a period of fifty years until it was replaced by the 
Children and Young Persons Act 1974. In August 1984 just ten 
years after the 1974 Act, Ann Hercus, Minister o f Social 
Welfare, set up a small working party to undertake a maj o r 
review of the Children and Young Persons Legislation. In 
December 1984, the working party produced a public discussion 
paper and distributed thousands of copies. Over 400 
submissions were received as a result of this paper. Since 
then a draft Bill has been prepared, which is planned to come 
into force on the 1st day of October 1987. The Bill is 
presently before the Select Committee. 
This paper concentrates on the theme of diversion. In doing so 
it considers three areas of central significance to the 
handling of young offenders. These are: arrest, pr o secution 
and diversion services. The discussion focuses on the way in 
which the 1987 Bill, the CYP Act 1974 and the discussi o n paper 
proposals deal with these three areas in relat io n t o the 
concept of diversion. 
2. DIVERSION THEME 
Many of the discussi o n paper pr o posa l s are based o n the theme 
of diversion. 
2 
states: 
The intro ducti o n t o the discussi o n paper 
Research indicates that, far from having t he salutary 
effect that some s upp o se, the stigma generated by a Co urt 
appearance c a n increa se the likelihood of a y o ung pe r s o n 
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committing further offences. For this reason it 1s 
proposed that new diversion procedures should be employed 
to obviate the necessity of a Court appearance for all 
but the most persistent and serious young offenders. 
This section of the paper provides analysis of the concept of 
diversion. The theme of diversion forms a basis from which to 
consider the more specifically focused areas presented 
subsequently. 
( i ) What is Diversion? 
Diversion is an exceedingly broad term and has been 
applied to many types of processes which have been 
conducted at various stages of the juvenile justice 
system. The concept can be used in at least two 
different ways. It can refer to processes employed to 
turn young persons away from the formal justice system 
and it can also be used to refer to reducing further 
penetration into the formal justice system at later 
stages (hence "diversion from prison''). This paper 
focuses on the former meaning, that is diversion away 
from the formal system. 
The concept of diversion is by no means new. The 
Juvenile Court itself was originally planned to divert 
children from the more formal court procedures applied to 
adults. Diversion from the Juvenile Courts has occurred 
informally for years through Police warnings and for 
instance when a shopkeeper decides to give a young 
shoplifter another chance by not reporting the incident. 
The CYP Act 1974 implemented formal processes of 
diversion in the form of Childrens Boards and Youth Aid 
consultation procedure. Under the CYP Act 1974 children 
(i.e. juveniles between 10 and 14 years) can not be 
proceeded against in court, other than by the complaints 
procedure 3
 except f o r murder and manslaughter. They 
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were instead to be diverted away from the formal court to 
the Children's Boards which were established under the 
4 
1974 Act. A "young person" (aged 14 to 17 years) can 
be brought before the court, charged in his or her own 
name with an offence. In non-arrest cases young persons 
appear in court only after consultation has taken place 
between the informant (whether a member of Police or 
otherwise), a Social Worker and a Community Officer 
appointed under the Maori Affairs Act 1962 where the 
option is taken up. This consultation procedure, set up 
by Section 26 of the CYP Act 1974, is called " Youth Aid 
Consultation" and is designed to aid diversion away from 
formal court processing. 
The central characteristic of any diversion process is 
that it offers an alternative to formal disposition. 
This alternative disposition is one based on treatment 
(such as social work, counselling, or employment 
assistance). The emphasis of diversion programmes is on 
measures designed to meet the "needs" of a young person 
(i.e. a welfare approach) whereas the emphasis of 
juvenile courts is on handling young persons according to 
their "deeds" by imposing punishment in accordance with 
the severity of the crime (i.e. the justice approach). 
Although the juvenile court is more concerned with 
punishment it does also offer the full range of youth 
services. If any treatment or service is prescribed, 
however, it is mandatory, and compulsory treatment 
delivered by the court is often viewed by the clients of 
the juvenile justice system as synonomous with 
punishment. On the other hand, the alternative 
disposition which diversion programmes offer is treatment 
provided on a voluntary basis. This voluntarism is an 
essential difference between the formal court process and 
the alternative informal diversion programmes
5 . 
Although the emphasis of diversion is on " treatment" it 
is important to recognise that in attempting to "treat" a 
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young person what is done may have all the essential 
attributes of punishment. It is easy to justify loss of 
a young persons liberty for lengthy periods on the 
grounds that the offender is being reformed rather than 
punished. There is a danger that diversion programmes 
become an instrument of coercion in the guise of 
reformatory treatment. 
In an early study of juvenile diversion for the National 
Assessment of Juvenile Corrections (in Britain), Cressy 
and McDermott (1973)
6 defined true diversion as 
occurring when a juvenile is completely out of the realm 
of the juvenile justice system and is immune from 
incurring the delinquent label 1n any of its variations. 
The problem with true or total diversion, however, is 
that it also eliminates the opportunity to provide needed 
assistance and services to young offenders. To avoid 
this, formal diversion programmes have been set up to 
divert young people away from the courts and direct them 
to needed services. 
(ii) Why Divert? 
(a) The Labelling Theory 
Arguments in favour of diversion programmes are 
based heavily on the labelling theory
7 The 
labelling theory attempts to explain delinquency as 
a result of negative labelling experiences. The 
suggestion is that the court process changes the 
self image of the juvenile. Increasingly the 
juveniles see themselves as a delinquent, acts as 
if they were delinquents and others respond to them 
as if they always were delinquents. So the public 
labelling of a juvenile as a delinquent serves as a 
self fulfilling prophecy. The discussion paper 
repeatedly expresses the growing concern that entry 
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into the official system increases the likelihood 
of re-offending because of labelling.
8 Diversion 
from the courts is hoped to avoid the stigma and 
labelling associated with a court appearance and 
therefore decrease further acts of delinquency. 
Questions have arisen as to the soundness of the 
labelling theory as an underlying assumption of 
diversion. Foster et al (1976)
10 for example, 
criticized the labelling argument, stating that 
the extent of perceived stigmatization and 
social liability that follows Police or court 
intervention seems to be over estimated 1n 
the labelling hypothesis. 
It is unknown how maJor an influence public 
labelling has on whether a juvenile re-offends. An 
individual may re-offend for reasons which have 
nothing to do with public labelling. Perhaps many 
young persons are by their very nature and 
character likely to re-offend. That is why they 
have been selected for prosecution. The fact that 
they are likely to re-offend may be seen as 
evidence that the decision to prosecute the young 
person was the right one. This young person needs 
to be dealt with formally because he may have 
re-offended regardless of any public labelling. 
There are however also young offenders whose 
re-offending may be due to the negative effects of 
labelling. Rutter and Giller (1983)
11 come to 
the conclusion that delinquency in juveniles is in 
most cases a passing phase that will come to an end 
without the need for rigorous intervention. For 
these young persons formal court processing may 
make things worse because of the consequential 
stigma and labelling. If Rutter and Giller are 
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correct and most juvenile delinquency is only a 
passing phase then a policy of minimal intervention 
and diversion away from the court is more 
appropriate for first and minor offenders. Formal 
court processing is perhaps too heavy handed for 
such offenders. 
The labelling theory as a justification for 
diversion away from the courts has also been 
criticized because the young person is likely to 
already be publicly labelled as a delinquent before 
he/she appears in court. Mahoney (1974)
12 points 
out that the stigma from the court may be vastly 
overrated since juvenile offenders often bear other 
labels such as bad school performance, being in 
difficulty with the Police, and so forth. There is 
also concern that the institutions which a person 
is diverted to and even the process by which the 
decision to divert is made may have an equally 
stigmatizing effect as the juvenile court. Osgood 
et al (1982)
13 however observed that with few 
exceptions, programmes offered by external 
diversion agencies were more benign and humane and 
were viewed by staff as less stigmatizing than 
formal programmes of the juvenile justice system. 
The staff perceptions, of course, may not reflect 
the feelings the young people have toward the 
agencies. It is probably true however that even if 
a young person has already to some extent been 
publicly labelled, a court appearance is likely to 
increase and re-enforce such labelling and the 
alternative diversion programmes are capable of 
being less stigmatizing than the court. 
Diversion is one response to concerns about 
labelling. Another response is to attempt to 
shield young persons from adverse labels or stigma 
(b) 
- 7 -
by changing the court process itself rather than 
diverting young persons away from the court 
process. In New Zealand the existence of a special 
court for juveniles (The Children and Young Persons 
Court), the creation of a special vocabulary, 
non-public hearings and according confidentiality 
are measures which attempt to protect a young 
person from negative social reactions. 
Contamination 
Criminal behaviour is likely to increase when 
individuals have more contact with people with 
delinquent than those with non-delinquent 
attitudes. Diversion it is argued can avoid 
"contamination", it can prevent "naive" offenders 
from associating with more experienced offenders. 
As with the labelling theory this requires 
identification of just who the "naive" offenders 
are. 
(c) Cost 
(d) 
Diversion is also viewed as a way of alleviating 
the already over-burdened juvenile courts, and as a 
cost effective method of processing cases. Because 
juvenile courts have limited staff and money they 
are often overloaded and as a result 
ineffectiveness increases. 
Effectiveness 
Diversion programmes are often considered a more 
effective and humanitarian method of processing 
young persons. They involve measures designed to 
rehabilitate and treat rather than punish . This is 
seen as especially appropriate for young offenders 
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because their youth and immaturity renders them 
more likely to be malleable and responsive to such 
an approach than older offenders who have become 
set in their ways. 
(iii) Problems with Diversion 
The notion of diversion is not without its problems. 
What appear to be good intentions may produce unexpected 
and negative effects. The results of the diversion 
movement may be quite different from what is intended. 
This section of the paper considers the possible problems 
diversion can have. 
(a) Widening the Net of Social Control 
Contrary to the expected reduction in penetration 
into the juvenile justice social control system 
14 
Blomberg (1979) argues that diversion has 
increased rather than limited the number of young 
persons receiving some kind of justice related 
15 
service. Stanley Cohen (1985) notes that: 
the population of new agencies are not simply 
the cast-offs from the old system, but new 
groups who might otherwise never have found 
themselves in contact with the official 
system at all. 
In other words offenders who would otherwise merely 
have been warned and released are now referred to 
the treatment services diversion programmes 
provide. It should also be noted that diversion 
may get more people into the formal system by 
drawing people into the diversion programmes and 
then referring them to the f o rmal system if they 
fail to respo nd to these programmes. Austin and 
(b) 
(c) 
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Krisberg (1981) 15 conclude that "diversion 
programmes have been transformed into a means for 
extending the net, making it stronger and creating 
new n~ts." A more recent study in America however 
concluded that diversion programmes if properly 
implemented, do not widen the net of social control 
and can be considered successful. 16 
Difficulties of Discretion 
The decision to divert involves large measures of 
discretion. As Giller and Covington (1983)
17 
point out exhortations that minor offenders should 
be dealt with informally and those who pose a "real 
or serious threat to society" should be referred to 
the court merely begs the question which has to be 
addressed. What precise circumstances should guide 
the exercise of discretion to divert? There is a 
danger that unfettered discretion may lead to 
discriminatory practices. However, structuring 
discretion is a difficult task and there are no 
grounds for believing that the particular words of 
decision making guidelines will be interpreted 
restrictively. The other problem with the 
discretion involved in diversion is that it is 
largely concealed and hence uncontrollable even if 
you have guidelines. The later section discussing 
prosecution criteria deals more specifically with 
the problems of structuring discretion. 
Due Process 
Diversion by its very nature dispenses with the due 
process rights normally afforded by the criminal 
trial. The young person will have admitted to 
guilt but there is never any formal finding of 
guilt. The loss of a day in court also ma kes it 
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very difficult to challenge pre-trial practices -
validity of arrest, search, interrogation etc. 
In many cases a young person admits guilt, not 
because they actually are guilty but because they 
are under pressure to do so in order to avoid a 
court appearance. Diversion allows "treatment" of 
a young person without any formal guilt. Lack of 
due process is of major concern if such "treatment" 
in reality resembles punishment. There 1s a danger 
that diversion can involve the unjustified 
infringement of human rights even though the 
objects of diversion are benevolent. Because of 
this danger the discretionary practices of those 
working in the diversion process should where 
possible be made visible and reviewable. 
(iv) Central Issues if Diversion 1s Implemented 
Although there are potential problems with diversion 
these problems are not inherent features of diversion. 
Formal court process is often an over reaction to the 
normal problems of adolescence. The strong reaction and 
potentially stigmatizing effect of formal court 
processing can exacerbate the long term problems for 
society. Diversion away from the courts and policies of 
minimal intervention and informal processing are worthy 
of implementation. It seems that if diversion programmes 
can be designed in a way which minimizes the possible 
problems then they have a chance of effectively dealing 
with young people, reducing recividism and alleviating 
the already over-burdened juvenile courts. 
Acceptance of the principles of diversion requires the 
establishment of sifting mechanisms to ensure that young 
persons only enter the juvenile court where public 
interest and justice demand it. These sifting mechanisms 
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are the pivotal points of the juvenile justice system. 
It is here that the crucial decision is made i.e. whether 
a child should be dealt with formally by the court or be 
diverted away from the court and dealt with informally. 
The implementation of diversion and the accompanying 
sifting mechanisms raises many questions: at what stage 
in the system should the mechanism(s) exist? Who should 
perform the "sift"? I.e. decide who to divert, should 
the discretion involved in this decision be controlled by 
statutory guidelines and if so what criteria should have 
most weight and finally what option should be available 
to divert a young person to? 
Three areas of the CYP Act 1974, the discussion paper and 
the 1987 Bill are now evaluated in relation to these 
questions which arise in any discussion of diversion. 
The three areas are arrest, prosecution and diversion 
services. 
3. A REVIEW OF THREE SPECIFIC AREAS 
(i) Arrest 
Arrest is one of the main gateways into the juvenile 
justice system. Under the current legislation arrest 
cases generally proceed directly to court. 18 There is 
no requirement for any prior consultation process as 
there is in non-arrest cases. Therefore the decision to 
arrest is the major sifting mechanism under the present 
system. It is at this point that a crucial decision is 
made. There are three possibilities. Firstly the young 
person might be arrested so that he/she may proceed 
directly to Court. Secondly the young person may be 
completely diverted away from the formal process by the 
mere issuing of a warning. The third possibility is to 
not arrest but still charge the young person with an 
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offence. In which case the young person must be referred 
to Youth Aid. In non arrest cases a young person may 
proceed to court only after the Youth Aid consultation 
process has · taken place. 
This consultation process is another sifting mechanism in 
the current juvenile justice system, where the decision 
about whether to recommend prosecution is made. By 
arresting the young person the consultation process can 
be by-passed. There is evidence from the research by the 
Institute of Criminology19 that Police constables in 
the Uniform Branch do not have complete confidence in the 
Youth Aid Section and may have arrested juveniles to 
avoid the need for referral to Youth Aid. At the arrest 
stage the arresting person has a large amount of power in 
determining whether the young person will be dealt with 
formally or informally. The action of arrest sets the 
formal process into action. 
Recognition of the important role, as a sifting 
mechanism, that the arrest stage plays in the present 
system prompts the question of how this power should be 
controlled . Under the present legislation the power to 
arrest is very wide. It can be exercised by any person, 
but the large majority of cases it is the Police who make 
arrests. The power to arrest must either be pursuant to 
a warrant, or if there 1s no warrant then it must be 
pursuant to statutory powers of arrest. The main 
statutory power to arrest is in Section 315(2) of the 
Crimes Act 1961: 
(2) Any constable, and all persons whom he calls 
t o his assistance, may arrest and take int o 
custody without a warrant -
(a) Any person whom he finds disturbing the 
public peace or committing any offence 
punishable by death o r i mpris o nment: 
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(b) Any person whom he has good cause to 
suspect of having committed a breach of 
the peace or any offence punishable by 
death or imprisonment: 
Section 32 of the Crimes Act 1961 states that where any 
constable has the power to arrest without a warrant he is 
justified in arresting any person whom he believes on 
reasonable and probable grounds to have committed an 
offence, whether or not that offence has in fact been 
committed or whether or not the arrested person committed 
it. The interpretation section defines justified as 
meaning not guilty of an offence and not l i able to any 
criminal proceedings. So the power of arrest is very 
wide. It can only be reviewed by the courts in terms of 
"belief on reasonable and probable grounds" and in 
practice the court will usually accept that at the time 
of arrest, the constable had such a belief, and the 
arrest was justified. The CYP Act 1974 contains 
additional powers for the arresting and detaining of 
21 juveniles, and these are very wide powers. For 
instance under section 12 if young persons are found 
unaccompanied by their parents or guardian or other 
person who have car of them and they are in an 
environment detrimental to their physical or moral well 
being then a Police Officer can use such force as may 
reasonably be necessary to take them and forthwith 
deliver them to a person who has care o f them. 
Th 1 . 1 . t . 2 O d . b f e Po ice genera ins ructions o require mem ers o 
the Police to exercise the utmost restraint and 
discretion in using the power to arrest children and 
young persons without warrant. They als o requ ir e 
supervis o rs to ensure that all arrests are ma de f o r goo d 
and sufficient r ea so ns and in accord with es tabli s hed 
policy . The instr ucti o ns ar e no t howe ver very de tailed. 
For instance there is no reference made t o wha t actually 
are "good and s uf ficient r e aso ns", also t he in s truc tio n s 
are not law. 
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The first point to make is that at present a very wide 
arrest power is given and after an arrest is made there 
is no other process in the juvenile justice system which 
enables some authority to investigate and consider the 
case, to see whether prosecution is or is not 
appropriate. The decision of whether to prosecute and 
deal formally with a young person or whether to divert 
the young person away from the formal court process 1s a 
very important decision. It should be made by some 
formal process outside of arrest. Even though this 
outside scrutiny will take extra time the importance of 
the decision warrants such time. A Police Officer's 
decision as to whether or not to arrest is frequently an 
instantaneous decision and made with a minimum amount of 
information. Both the Bill and the discussion paper 
proposals involve certain formal processes to be carried 
out before prosecution can ensue regardless of whether 
the case is an arrest one or a non-arrest one. These 
processes are different in the Bill and the discussion 
paper and are discussed later in the paper. They go some 
way to limiting the power which at present resides 1n an 
arresting officer. They reduce the role of arrest as the 
major sifting mechanism involved in diversion. 
These other sifting mechanisms do not however justify the 
arrest power being left as wide as it is at present. 
Firstly, once a young person has been arrested, even if 
the prosecution decision process which follows diverts 
him/her away from formal court process, that young person 
may still have suffered negative labelling effects due to 
the actual arrest itself and also possibly the 
prosecution decision process itself (depending what this 
is) . This "labelling" could lead to re-offending. 
Secondly the arrest power at present is open to abuse. 
In the course of research by the Institute of 
C · · 1 
22 h . h" h h t r1m1no ogy t e way 1n w 1c t.e arres power was 
exercised was frequently commented on by parents and 
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children who were interviewed. Concern was expressed for 
example about the Police arriving late at night or early 
in the morning of parents being notified of the arrest 
long after it had happened and of Police being 
obstructive about requests from young persons to consult 
lawyers. The research also showed that the arrest power 
was not always used as a last resort. Sometimes in minor 
cases arrest was used merely because it had practical 
23 advantages (e.g. obtaining of photographs and 
fingerprints). It is important then that some 
restrictions are placed on the present power of arrest in 
order to reduce the possible labelling effects of arrest 
and the possible abuse of arrest power by helping to 
ensure that arrest is used only as a last resort. 
However given the pressures on Police at present to 
arrest, the form of the restrictions and the practical 
effect of such provisions may be problematic. 
The discussion paper proposals specify circumstances 
under which an arrest is authorised. These circumstances 
are the same as those required by the CYP Bill. Clause 
114(a) of the Bill requires that the arresting officer 
must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that it is 
necessary to arrest the child or young person for the 
purpose of either ensuring appearance before a court, 
preventing further offending, or preventing loss or 
destruction of evidence relating to the offence. Clause 
114(b) provides that the arresting officer must also be 
satisfied that the proceedings by way of summons would 
. . l ( )24 not achieve any of the purposes 1n Cause 114 a 
The restrictions in the Bill on arrest power are a 
substantial impr ov e ment on existing legislat i on. The 
next problem is how these restrictions can best be 
enforced. 
One way the r est ric_io ns o n arrest can be enforced under 
the Bill is by the ve ry f act that the restrictions are 
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law so are subject to judicial review. The arresting 
officer actually has to be satisfied on reasonable 
grounds of 114(a) and (b) and if the court finds this is 
not so then - the arrest is unlawful. But to have this as 
the only way of enforcing the restrictions is however of 
limited practical effect. There are likely to be times 
when an arresting officer is not satisfied on reasonable 
grounds of (a) or (b) but the young person and parents 
are unaware of the right to sue and have no money to do 
so. Also the problem with civil action is that for most 
people it is wholly unrealistic especially where the 
young person is guilty. Anyway in most cases the test is 
in fact fairly easy to satisfy. Ex post facto the Police 
Officer will not find it difficult to show that there 
were reasonable grounds for believing the young person 
was offending and from this it always follows that there 
were also reasonable grounds for believing further 
offending is likely and a summons is ineffective. The 
real problem is that even if the test has been satisfied 
it does not always justify the possible negative effects 
of arrest on the child. As well as being infrequent, 
judicial review comes too late, the unlawful arrest has 
already occurred, the harm has already been done. In any 
case, the arresting officer who is found guilty of not 
following the requirements is unlikely to be severely 
dealt with by the court and the young person is unlikely 
to be provided with very meaningful remedies. 
As well as judicial review the Bill contains a reporting 
provision as a way of enforcing the restrictions the Bill 
places on arrest. Clause 114(2) requires the arresting 
officer to furnish a written report to a senior member of 
the Police and a Senior Youth Aid Officer within three 
days of the arrest. The Bill however fails to require 
the report to indicate either the grounds for arrest or 
the reasons why a summons could not be used instead. It 
could be argued on the present wording that the report 
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need only state that an arrest has been made. This might 
be seen as a problem of drafting but could perhaps be 
rather more than this. It may be a problem of attitude 
and approach. The report need not be detailed because 
nobody else will see it and it isn't seriously intended 
to interfere with acts which the Police Officers see as 
justified in the practical situations they face. The 
lack of a detailed requirement suggests that the report 
is a formality not to be taken too seriously. 
The discussion paper also proposes the furnishing of a 
. 25 b h . . written report , ut t e requirement is more 
detailed. It must be a detailed written report on th 
exercise of the power and the circumstances under which 
it came to be exercised. This provision goes a lot 
further than the Bill does but would be even better if it 
included a requirement for the report to indicate the 
reasons why a summons could not be used instead. 
Although there is still the possibility that this 
detailed written requirement would not be taken seriously 
it has more likely to be an effective enforcement measure 
than the reporting provision of the Bill. 
In addition to the furnishing of a written report the 
discussion paper proposals include a "permission" 
provision 26 as a way of enforcing the restrictions o n 
arrest power. This provision requires the arresting 
officer to obtain the permission of a Senior Youth Aid 
Officer, or where this is not reasonably practicable, t o 
obtain permission from a senior supervising 
non-commissioned officer. This is not however required 
if because of the location of the Police District or the 
nature of the situation it is not po s s ible to obtain such 
permission. The provisi o n is designed to inhibit arrest 
by making it more inc o nvenient however it is unlikely to 
work in pract i ce, a nd a detai l ed rep o rting pr ovi sio n 
alone co uld a chieve t h is just a s well. Many ar rests of 
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young people occur late at night when a Youth Aid Officer 
is unlikely to be on duty. For this reason alone it 
would be "not reasonably practicable" to obtain the 
permission of a senior Youth Aid Officer. There are many 
other situations, especially in rural areas when it is 
not possible for the arresting officer to seek permission 
to arrest from either a senior Youth Aid Officer or a 
senior supervising non-commissioned officer. In any case 
if permission was sought, the facts would probably be 
briefly outlined to the Youth Aid Officer by the 
arresting officer, usually over the radio telephone. 
This would be a poor basis for the Youth Aid Officer's 
decision of whether or not to give permission. The 
provisions are unlikely to effectively enforce the 
restrictions on the power of arrest. The better way of 
enforcing the restriction is the requirement of a 
detailed written report. 
In so far as the submissions on the discussion paper 
related to the restriction of arrest power the response 
was mixed. Some were concerned that by restricting the 
arrest power in the way the discussion paper proposes, 
the Police role would be weakened leading to the 
escalation of unacceptable behaviour amongst young 
b . . t . h' 27 persons. One su m1ss1on pu 1t t 1s way: 
The restriction on arrest power would be a serious 
impediment to the Police in the carrying out of 
their duties which will result in anarchy and 
increased vandalism. 
If however the permission provision was deleted then 
perhaps views like this would no t be s o str o ng. The 
Police in Wellington were concerned that the restrictions 
on arrest power in the discussi o n paper implied that 
young people need pr o tection fr om Po lice and th a t this 
was dam aging t o Po li c e mo rale. This howeve r , i s a fai r ly 
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trivial response. There were just as many submissions 
however which supported the proposals to restrict the 
power or arrest and were concerned with the large amount 
of power presently held by Police in relation to arrest. 
The other provision in the Bill in relation to arrest is 
Clause 115. It requires that the person having care of 
young persons should be notified to their arrest as soon 
as possible. This provision follows the discussion paper 
proposals 28
 however where the Bill uses the words "as 
soon as possible" the discussion paper says "forthwith". 
"As soon as possible" is a more realistic requirement 
since forthwith is not always possible. Clause 115 is an 
improvement on the existing legislation which has no such 
similar provision. The discussion paper also says that 
where a young person identifies as a Maori or Pacific 
Islander a Maatua Whangai worker or a person nominated by 
a Pacific Island Community group should also be 
notified. This is not included in the Bill for good 
reasons. The young person may not wish such a person to 
be notified and could resent it. It also discriminates 
against other ethnic groups by singling out Maoris and 
Pacific Islanders. 
Overall the Bill and the discussion paper have different 
approaches toward arrest. The discussion paper proposals 
make a serious attempt to ensure that arrest is used as a 
last resort. The permission proposal (although this may 
not wor k in practice) and the detailed written reporting 
provisions are designed to inhibit arrest to stop it 
occurring unthinkingly as it often does at present. The 
Bill's attempts to inhibit arrest however do not go as 
far as the discussion paper. The permission pr ovision is 
not included and the reporting provision is very vague. 
The result is that reliance will remain on the common 
sense and individual judgment of Police Officers o n the 
street. 
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(ii) Prosecution 
Under the present legislation arrest cases undergo no 
further sifting stage before prosecution. In non arrest 
cases, however, the Youth Aid consultation procedure 
operates as a sifting mechanism attempting to ensure that 
prosecutions are not made unnecessarily. The CYP Act 
1974 section 26 sets up this procedure. The process 
involves consultation between an informant (this will 
usually be a member of the Police), a Social Worker and a 
Community Officer appointed under Section 4 of the Maori 
Welfare Act 1962 where the option is taken up. The young 
person and the parents are not involved. Those 
participating in the consultation may recommend no 
action, a Police warning, referral to counselling or 
other informal action or they may recommend prosecution. 
This is only a recommendation, the final decision on 
prosecution is with the Police. The review of the CYP 
legislation raises the questions of who should be making 
the prosecution decision and how it should be made. 
(a) Who Should Make the Prosecution Decision? 
Clause 120 of the Bill abolishes this consultation 
procedure and leaves the decision to prosecute a 
young person in the hands of the Police. It 
abolishes the consultation process and gives the 
Police guidelines to make their decision (these are 
dealt with in part (b) of this Section. The main 
problem with the present system is that the 
consultation process is largely dominated by the 
Police. So if the Police are to be directly 
involved 1n the prosecution decision it is less 
cumbersome and less time consuming to adopt the 
approach of the Bill than to attempt to have some 
kind of consultati o n process . In the Youth Aid 
consultations it is usually only the Police who 
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have knowledge of the situation so the Social 
Worker can contribute little to the decisions. 
Therefore the consultation process is often little 
more than a "rubber stamp" for Police wishes. Of 
course Police attitudes towards the consultation 
process are likely to differ between areas. In 
some areas Police are anxious to make the process 
work by encouraging Social Workers to participate 
but the differing Police attitudes appear to have 
little effect on the nature and outcome of 
consultations. In all areas the structure 
inevitably leads to Police domination and 
control. 29 Another objection to the present 
consultation procedure is that there is no 
community involvement and no opportunity for the 
alleged offender or parents to be present. It 
would be common that none of the parties involved 
would have first hand knowledge of either the young 
person or the incident. Also the procedure can be 
totally by-passed by following the arrest procedure. 
The discussion paper proposes that a Youth 
Assessment Panel be established to make the 
. d . . 30 prosecution ec1s1on. 
the Youth Aid Scheme. 
This is a development of 
It would apply to all young 
persons aged 12 to 17 years alleged to have 
committed an offence not just to non-arrest cases. 
The panel would consist of a senior Police Officer, 
a senior Social Worker a Maatua Whangai worker and 
where the young person is a Pacific Islander, a 
person nominated by an appropriate Pacific island 
community group. Many of the submissions on the 
discussion paper which agreed with the Youth 
Assessment Panel in principle, felt that the 
involvement of the young person's parents and a 
school representative was also necessary . However 
in practice this may not always be possible. 
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Teachers and parents may not always be willing or 
available for such consultations and even if they 
did participate, the Police would still have the 
final · say. The establishment of Youth Assessment 
panels does not remove the problem of Police 
domination. The consultation process would be much 
the same as present and since the Police generally 
have exclusive knowledge and control of the 
information being considered, the Police will 
inevitably dominate the process. The other members 
of the panel are unlikely to contribute much to the 
decision and in any case the final decision is 
still only a recommendation and is not binding on 
the Police. The addition of a Maatua Whangai and a 
person nominated by an appropriate Pacific Island 
community group may cause problems if the youth 
does not want assistance from either his/her ethnic 
community. This provision also discriminates 
against other ethnic minorities who do not receive 
similar treatment. It would be better to allow 
culturally appropriate people to attend if desired 
by the young person. There is a danger that as the 
consultation meetings become larger they become 
more formal and the massive inquiry is more likely 
to have a labelling effect on young persons before 
they even reach court. 
If the Police are to be directly involved in the 
prosecution decision the approach of the Bill is 
less time consuming and cumbersome than attempting 
to have some kind of consultation process. The 
question then arises of whether in actual fact the 
Police are the appropriate agency for making the 
decision to divert young people away from the 
courts. 31 It is not a task for which the Police 
have been given any special training and it is a 
task which is at odds with demands made on the 
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Police to "do someching about" juvenile 
delinquency. The Police are likely to believe in 
the prosecution ethic. The central duties of the 
Police are prevention, control and detection of 
crime and the normal end product is to take the 
individual to court. If the Police make the 
prosecution decisions it leads to a conflict 1n the 
various roles performed by an individual Officer. 
If diversion is to occur effectively it would seem 
preferable to have an independent sifting authority 
as Scotland does. This possibility was referred to 
32 
1n the discussion paper. In Scotland 
independent reporters decide on the basis of 
reports, whether the child referred to them is in 
need of "compulsory measures of care"
33 in other 
words whether or not the child can be diverted from 
the formal children's hearings (the Scottish 
equivalent of the juvenile courts). The reporters 
stand as an independent and visible sifting 
mechanism between the Police and the children's 
hearings. This sifting mechanism for diversion has 
reduced the number of children appearing before the 
children's hearings by 45 per cent between 1970 and 
1976. 34 In some cases this involved total 
diversion, that is no further action at all. To 
the extent that reporters are prepared to give a 
large number of no action disposals, reporters are 
resisting pressures to act primarily as law 
enforcement agents. Reporters are also free to 
utilise community programmes where these exist and 
seem desirable. The limits of action lie in the 
imagination of the reporter and the consent of the 
child. This could be transferred to the New 
Zealand context and meet the objective o f the 
. . 35 d ·1136 . 1 d1scuss1on paper an 81 to 1nvo ve 
community agencies. 
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(b) 
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Statutory Guidelines for the Prosecution Decision 
The CYP Act 1974 does not enact any statutory 
guideiines for the prosecution decision. Whoever 
makes the decision to divert, whether it 1s the 
Police or some other independent authority, it 
would be helpful if they had some statutory 
guidelines to aid them in the exercise of their 
discretion. It is true however that statutory 
guidelines can not hope to totally solve the 
problem of whether or not to divert a young 
person. They would however allow the Government to 
have more control over an important decision. This 
1s a good thing as it results in an increased 
consistency of decisions and a higher level of 
public accountability. It also enables 
justifications for Police Officers' decisions to 
become more focused on relevant factors. If Police 
Officers' decisions are questioned they can point 
to the set of guidelines and say Parliament told 
them to take X or Y into consideration when 
exercising their discretion. At present they might 
justify their decision merely on the grounds that 
it was totally in their discretion. Most 
importantly statutory guidelines would go some way 
ensuring that prosecutions are not brought 
unnecessarily. 
The Bill and the discussion paper proposals specify 
certain criteria which should be taken into 
consideration when deciding whether to recommend 
that young person be prosecuted. The Bill contains 
a list of thirteen factors (the discussion paper 
contains a similar list
37 ) to be considered by 
the Youth Officer who prepares a report for the 
authorising Officer who having regard to this 
report has the final decision on whether or not t o 
- 25 -
prosecute. There is however no indication of the 
weight to be attached to each of them so they have 
limited use as a set of guidelines. The 
introductory words of clause 120(4) of the Bill 
says such matters as the Youth Aid Officer 
considers important shall be taken into account. 
So this still leaves open the question of what 
exactly is important. Also some of the criteria 
are not very specific in that they do not state the 
effect the particular criteria will have. For 
example Clause 120(4)(i) of the Bill specifies age 
as a relevant criterion. Presumably this means the 
younger a child 1s the less likely he is to be 
prosecuted. If it means this it should say this. 
Clause 120(4)(d) of the Bill lists the young 
person's attitude to the offence as a criterion. 
Presumably this means if a young person lS 
remorseful they are more likely not to be 
prosecuted. And 1n 120(4)(m) plans put forward by 
the young person to compensate the victim are also 
listed as a criterion. Both of these criteria 
suggest that young persons who admit guilt, but are 
sorry and willing to make amends are less likely to 
be prosecuted than young persons who swear they did 
not commit the offence at all. So if young persons 
have in actual fact not committed the offence it 
would be wiser for them to pretend they are guilty 
in order to avoid prosecution. This pressure to 
admit guilt 1s a danger in diversion programmes. 
However it seems that the benefits of diversion 
outweigh this possible problem. Anyway if the 
Police are convinced a young person did commit an 
offence and that young person is adamant he did 
not, then the court 1s the best place to fight the 
battle because here the young person has the full 
rights of due process. 
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Clearly one of the main criteria should be that the 
prosecution agency is satisfied there is a 
reasonable prospect of conviction. It is unfair to 
subject a young person to the formal court process 
when there is little chance of conviction. This 
would serve no useful purpose. In the Bill and the 
discussion paper however the sufficiency of 
evidence is given no more weight than any other 
criteria. It would be better if the guidelines 
were to state that the prosecution agency need to 
be satisfied that there is a reasonable prospect of 
conviction before prosecution is brought. 
The discussion paper proposals give the criteria of 
public interest equal weight to the other criteria 
listed. The Bill however takes a different 
approach. The Youth Aid Officer has to take 13 
factors into consideration and prepare a written 
report. Public interest is not singled out as one 
of these factors. The report is then taken into 
consideration by an authorising officer who has the 
final decision as to whether or not to prosecute. 
Clause 130(3) requires that the authorising officer 
shall not prosecute unless having regard to the 
Youth Aid Officer's report he/she is satisfied 
that, because of the seriousness of persistence of 
the offending or the nature and number of previous 
offences committed by the child or young person, 
the institution o f criminal proceeding is required 
in the interests of the child or young person or in 
the public interes t . The persistence of the 
offending and the na ture and number of previ ous 
offences c ommit t e d a re probably the most releva nt 
factors in determining whether a young pers o n wi ll 
re-offend. It is unnecessary to subject f i rst time 
o ffenders t o t he forma l court pr ocess i f the y a re 
unlikely to re-offend. Their o ff e nding is pr o bably 
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a passing phase and court process is only likely to 
increase the chances of re-offending because of its 
possible negative labelling effect. Seriousness of 
the offence may or may not be relevant to the 
likelihood of re-offending but it is relevant in 
that society wishes to show it will not tolerate 
such offending. 
The Bill has the public interest as an overriding 
factor which is of central importance and then the 
factors in the Youth Aid Officers report can be 
used to determine whether the public interest 
requires prosecution. The Bill however adds that 
the interests of the child or young person can be 
used as an alternative to the public interest as a 
justification. It seems wrong to justify the 
institution of formal criminal proceedings merely 
on the basis of the supposed welfare of the child. 
It can never be certain what effect court process 
will have on any given individual child and young 
offenders may be more effectively dealt with 
informally. Their behaviour is often, as Rutter 
and Giller (1983)
38 conclude, merely a passing 
phase of growing up. There is a danger that court 
process will result in negative labelling effects 
which may lead to re-offending. It would be better 
if the justification was based on public interest 
alone. If court process is required in the 
interests of the child or young person then surely 
it will also be required in the public interest for 
this very reason. 
There is a concern that by including social factors 
as well as offence related factors in the 
guidelines can lead to discriminatory practices in 
that two people who have committed the same offence 
may be treated diffe:ently . However if considering 
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the action in its wider social context helps to 
lower re-offending rates and ensure unnecessary 
prosecutions are not brought unnecessarily then it 
is worthwhile. 
The process involving the Youth Aid Officer and an 
authorising officer is a worthwhile one. It means 
that the final decision is based not only on a 
recommendation but on a detailed report as well. 
This means both the Youth Aid Officer and the 
authorising officer have to consider all the 
relevant information before they make a choice as 
to which course of action is appropriate. 
It is difficult to set out useful guidelines for a 
decision which inevitably involves significant 
amounts of discretion. However any attempts to 
raise a presumption against prosecution in relation 
to juvenile offenders and to specify criteria by 
which the presumption can be rebutted are an 
improvement on present legislation. It is 
important that prosecutions are not brought 
unnecessarily and are used sparingly and 
selectively. Statutory guidelines should go some 
way toward achieving this. 
(iii) Diversion Services 
The concept of diversion necessarily involves the 
establishment of informal community based services. 
These services should be provided on a voluntary basis 
and are an alternative to formal court process. The 
following is an assessment of the two diversion services 
the discussion paper proposes; Community Resolution 
Meetings and Maori Committees. 
The CYP Act 1974 and the Sill do not incorporate the 
establishment of any diversion services into their 
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provisions at all. This is a major failing of the Bill. 
Reliance will now have to be placed on the hope that such 
services and others will be set up in New Zealand despite 
the lack of ·a statute to provide for their 
establishment. In the present and foreseeable climate 
this is highly unlikely and yet it is vital that adequate 
services are available to which a young diverted person 
can be referred. 
(a) Community Resolution Meetings 
The discussion paper proposals include referral to 
a Community Resolution Pane1
39 as one of the 
options a Youth Assessment Panel has when deciding 
how to deal with a young person referred to them 
The function of the meetings would achieve a 
reconciliation between the offender, the victim of 
the offence and the community. Some measure of 
"pay back'' could be arranged by the young offender, 
this could be an apology or community service. The 
referral should only be made where the young person 
and his/her family and any victim of the offence 
consent. The Youth Assessment Panel would have to 
believe a prosecution would be justified. This 
would limit possible net-widening effects. The 
mediation would be done by two people from the 
young person's local community who would be chosen 
by the Youth Assessment panel from a panel of 
voluntary trained mediators and where possible 
mediators of the same culture would be chosen. The 
Community Resolution Meeting would be attended by 
the young person, his/her family, any other person 
the young person wishes to be present, the young 
persons Social Worker and any victims of the 
offence. However the victim would not be required 
to attend . Where there is no direct victim some 
representative of the community chosen by the 
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mediators would attend the meeting. If the meeting 
could not achieve a resolution the matter should be 
referred back to the Youth Assessment Panel. If 
the young person failed to fulfil the terms of the 
agreement there would be no redress. 
Achieving reconciliation between the offender and 
victim seems a worthy concept which should be 
attempted in New Zealand. In the present juvenile 
justice system there is little consideration given 
to the victim at all. However the proposed system 
does have faults. The proposal offers no redress 
if the terms of the agreement are no fulfilled. 
This lack of redress is based on the belief that 
diversion programmes should be voluntary and 
informal. The idea is for the victim and offender 
to come to an agreement largely by themselves. The 
resolution process becomes a sham if the agency 
exercises too much control and begins to act like a 
court. Although the proposal suggests no direct 
redress there is little doubt that if the young 
person later re-offends this failure to meet the 
terms of a previous resolution agreement would be 
taken into consideration when the sifting authority 
decide whether or not the young person should this 
time be diverted from the court. However, for the 
system to make more sense to its consumers and be 
accepted by the community (which are principles of 
the discussion paper
40 ) then when an offender 
fails to fulfil the terms of the agreement there 
should be some redress or enforcement mechanism. 
Clearly entering the mediation process should be 
voluntary as with all diversion services . However 
if young offenders choose to use the diversion 
service they should then face their 
responsibilities for agreements reached by the 
mediation . If the young person fails to honour the 
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agreement the matter should be referred back to the 
Youth Assessment panel or other independent sifting 
authority. 
Another possible objection to the scheme is that it 
unfairly favours the young person who fortuitously 
offends against a fair minded victim who is willing 
to come to a reasonable agreement. If the victim 
either refuses to consent to mediation at all or 
unreasonably fails to reach an agreement at the 
meeting then the young offender will be referred 
back to the Youth Assessment panel with the 
consequent possibility of prosecution. The v ictim 
1s put in a position of power where he/she is able 
to some extent determine the severity of treatment 
the offender receives. The problem with this is 
that it results in a large disparity of treatment 
between young offenders who, apart from their 
victim, have committed the same offence in similar 
circumstances. However assisting the young person 
and victim to understand, if possible, one 
another's feelings in relation t o the offence and 
achieve reconciliation achieves gains which 
outweigh the possible disparity of treatment of 
young offenders. Anyway it is not wrong t o expect 
offenders to take their v i ctims as they find the m. 
If the victim is amenable to a reasonable 
reconciliation this is good fortune on the 
offender's part, if not, the juvenile justice 
system will be forced to deal with the offende r by 
prosecution or some other way. 
The attempt o f t he proposed system t o i ncl ude the 
cases where there is no victim within the 
resolution process could pose problems. I t 1s 
pr o po sed tha t t he mediati on will be be twe e n the 
yo ung o ffender and s ome representat ive of t he loca l 
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community. Since "community" is a very wide 
concept which is made of many different social 
groups with varying values and interests it would 
be impossible to choose a true representative of 
the community as a whole. The young offender is 
likely to find it difficult to understand the point 
of reaching a reconciliation agreement with someone 
who has nothing to do with the offence except that 
he/she is part of the community within which the 
offence was committed. Effective reconciliation 
would be minimal. The reconciliation concept is 
most appropriate for offenders and their victims. 
Another criticism is that the proposal for two 
mediators seems unnecessary and if there are too 
many people at the meeting the young offender can 
feel overwhelmed, making mediation difficult. 
Lastly it is also important that the meetings 
should be arranged as quickly as possible since 
undue delay is a complaint often made about the 
present Children's Board meetings. 
(b) Maori Committees 
The discussion paper proposes referral to a Maori 
C · 
41 th t. . 1 bl t th omm1ttee as ano er op 10n ava1 a e o e 
Youth Assessment panel when deciding how to deal 
with a young offender who identifies as a Maori. 
Again young persons, their family and any victims 
have to give consent to the referral and the panel 
must believe prosecution would be justified. The 
discussion paper recognises the existence of Maori 
Committees under the Maori Community Development 
Act 1962 and considers it possible to extend their 
role to deal with certain young offenders. 
The Bill makes no reference to the Maori 
Committees. Diverting young offenders to 1aori 
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It is a Committees seems to be a worthy proposal. 
service which would recognise the cultural 
diversity of New Zealand. The Committee however 
should only be used if the offender genuinely 
identifies with the Maori Community. If the 
service is foisted on parents and children without 
their full consent it could cause resentment. It 
would also be a good idea for local communities to 
develop, if possible, committees for other cultural 
minorities. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The juvenile court is only one way society can react to those 
young persons who commit wrongful acts. A judicial response 
however is not always necessary or desirable. The current 
trend toward diverting people away from the court founded on 
the belief that positive and effective responses to delinquency 
are available outside the already overloaded court system. 
There are of course problems with diversion which have already 
been canvassed. These problems however are not inherent 
features of diversion and can be minimised. 
Both the discussion paper and the Bill are an improvement on 
existing legislation. The approaches however are different. 
They do both restrict the powers of arrest, establish 
guidelines for the prosecution decision and abolish the Youth 
Aid consultation process as it is at present. 
It seems, however, that the discussion paper makes more of an 
attempt to maximise the benefits of diversion and minimise the 
problems. For instance the provision enforcing the 
restrictions on the power of arrest are more stringent than 
. . 1 b 1· 42 those of the Bill which are perhaps mere y sym o ic 
The discussion paper seems more committed to inhibiting arrest 
so it is used only as a last resort thus encouraging the 
'MW Ul'3RMW 
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diversion away from the formal system at the arrest stage. The 
Youth Assessment Panel proposal of the discussion paper 
endeavours to have more than just Police involved in the 
prosecution decision and also suggests an independent sifting 
authority, as they have in Scotland, as a favourable 
alternative. Because of the police's belief in the prosecution 
ethic this emphasis on removing the Police from the prosecution 
decision seems desirable if diversion is to occur effectively. 
The Bill on the other hand leaves the decision to prosecute 
soley in the hands of the Police. Finally the discussion paper 
includes proposals which establish two worthwhile diversion 
programmes. The Bill however fails to provide any such 
services which are vital for the success of diversion. 
One thing is clear, the existing legislation is in need of 
reform. The Bill involves some worthwhile changes and omits to 
include other possible improvements . It remains to be seen how 
the changes in legislation will actually effect the juvenile 
justice system in practice. Meaningful changes in any system 
however require not only changes in the law but changes in the 
attitudes of the people who are part of that system. 
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